Introduction 32

Background 33
Explaining how cooperation works outside of the confines of direct reciprocal relationships 34 and close familial ties, especially in large-scale human societies, has become a major focus 35 of research. Prominent amongst explanations is the notion of indirect reciprocity. This is like 36 direct reciprocity in that it involves one individual paying some cost to benefit another, and 37 then another paying a cost to benefit the original donor. Provided the benefits exceed the 38 costs then both make a net profit. Where indirect reciprocity differs from direct reciprocity is 39 in that the reciprocation comes from an individual other than the recipient (Alexander, 1987; 40 Boyd & Richerson, 1989) . The mechanism of indirect reciprocity is illustrated in Figure 1 . If 41 direct reciprocity is a system of "I scratch your back, you scratch mine" then indirect 42 reciprocity is a case of "I scratch your back, someone else scratches mine". This is important 43 because indirect reciprocity is sometimes wrongly thought of as an umbrella term for fitness 44 benefits arising through third parties. 45
46
A key advance came with the proposal of a mechanism by which indirect reciprocity might 47 work: if individuals who help others acquire a cooperative reputation, or 'image score' 48 (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998) ; and if potential donors use these image scores to decide 49 whether to help; then simulations show that this can lead to mutually beneficial cooperation 50 (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005) . Crucially, and in contrast to direct reciprocity (Axelrod & 51 Hamilton, 1981) , this is said to occur even when donors never meet their recipients again to 52 get a direct return (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998 ). This appears to be supported by experimental 53 evidence that people give preferentially to those with positive image scores (Milinski, 2016 Wedekind & Milinski, 2000) . Indirect reciprocity has 56 consequently become established as a "decisive" (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998 ) explanation for 57 cooperation, especially for human sociality, accounting for large-scale fluid societies; for why 58 individuals care about being seen to help others; for language; and for morality (Nowak & 59 Sigmund, 2005) . Despite being fundamentally criticized (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001) , the 60 literature on indirect reciprocity has burgeoned (e.g. (Brandt & Sigmund, 2005 That is, individuals do not help other helpers to receive something back from third parties; 66 instead, they help because this furthers the spread of a strategy of helping those who help 67 others (see Figure 1 for a comparison of the mechanisms of indirect reciprocity, image 68 scoring and relatedness). I demonstrate this claim by showing first how 'image scoring' 69 models and experiments do not provide a mechanism for the evolution of indirect reciprocity; 70
secondly showing that what has been termed 'indirect reciprocity' is not driven by reciprocity 71 at all; and thirdly showing the key role of relatedness in driving cooperation in image scoring 72 (and 'standing') systems. In each case I draw on game theoretic analyses, evolutionary 73 simulation, and empirical data. 74 75 I begin with the dilemma that image scoring is not an adaptive strategy. For cooperation (as 76 referred to in game theory as a behaviour which benefits others but which may involve a cost 77 to the actor (West, Griffin, & Gardner, 2007) ) to bring fitness benefits, there must be a 78 relationship between giving and receiving such that the costs of cooperating are outweighed 79 by the benefits of receiving, relative to non-cooperators. Image scoring offers a mechanism 80 for linking donations with returns through being able to identify and direct cooperation 81 towards those who have cooperated. Image scorers are discriminating: they cooperate 82 according to the recipient image score, which is a function of how cooperative the recipient 83 itself has been. However, the logic of image scoring contains an in-built inconsistency which 84 means it cannot explain indirect reciprocity. 85
86
This inconsistency centres on the fact that image scoring strategies do not evolve when 87 individuals are self-interested, i.e. when they are maximizing their payoff. This can readily be 88 shown analytically. A population of image scorers (i.e. those that take into account the image 89 score of a recipient in deciding whether to give) is invaded by those who help others 90 indiscriminately (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001) . This is because when a population is 91 dominated by individuals playing a strategy of 'help those with a positive image score', an 92 individual will receive more when they take more opportunities to cooperate (Leimar & 93 Hammerstein, 2001) . It pays to have the maximum image score since this attracts the 94 largest number of donations. Crucially this is true regardless of the image score of the 95 recipient. Thus, it will pay individuals to help on every move, even if this means helping 96 defectors rather than playing the discriminating image scoring strategy. Hence, image 97 scoring is not in an individuals' best interests (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001) . 98
99
If image scoring were adaptive then agent-based evolutionary simulation models should 100 provide evidence that IS strategies invade and reach a stable equilibrium in which they are 101 at fixation in the population. The simulations of Nowak and Sigmund (Nowak & Sigmund, 102 1998) actually show unstable behaviour, and their methods have been questioned (Leimar & 103 Hammerstein, 2001). Following Leimar and Hammerstein's island-based method (Leimar & 104 Hammerstein, 2001), and using a simplified system in which image scores are 0 and 1 105 depending on the last move, Roberts (2015) confirmed that the dynamics of IS are very 106 Fig 3a) . Further, the strategies which evolved were not discriminating, as 107 required if they follow image scoring rules. Rather they showed virtually no preference for 108 giving to those who had previously cooperated or defected (Ref 22 , Fig 4) : with the 109 parameters used in this simulation, the mean image score of those donated to was -0.13 ± 110 6 0.03. A mean recipient image score so close to zero implies that potential donors playing IS 111 are showing no discrimination by image score. Without discrimination, cooperation cannot be 112 sustained because there is no correlation between giving and receiving (Gilbert Roberts, 113 2015) . 114
115
Empirical evidence supporting image scoring as an adaptive strategy is weaker than often 116
supposed. There appears to be widespread evidence that people behave more prosocially 117 when they are observed, although this may be more nuanced than commonly thought 118 (Bradley, Lawrence, & Ferguson, 2018) . However, this cannot be taken as evidence for 119 indirect reciprocity as opposed to the range of other possible benefits arising from being 120 observed, such as reputation-based partner choice (Roberts, 1998; Sylwester & Roberts, 121 2010 . Students in experimental economic games do show at least partial 122 discrimination, tending to give more often to those with high image scores (Wedekind & 123 Milinski, 2000) . However, while this has been interpreted as evidence for indirect reciprocity 124 via image scoring, the experiments do not necessarily show that those who donate more get 125 higher payoffs. Groups with more donors can do better (Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 126 2002; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000) , but this has to be true because the benefit of receiving a 127 donation is always set by the experimenter to be greater than the cost of donating (otherwise 128 reciprocity would bring no advantage), hence the relationship between donations and group 129 profit is an input rather than an interesting result of the experiment. Indirect reciprocity 130 requires that individuals do better than others within their own groups by engaging in 131 donations, but this is not always the case. For example, one leading paper reporting image 132 scoring does not find evidence for image scoring giving higher payoffs than other strategies. 133
A benefit to individuals has been shown only when indirect reciprocity is combined with 134 another game (Milinski et al., 2002; Wedekind & Braithwaite, 2002; Wedekind & Milinski, 135 2000) . Combining games in this way allows individuals to make a profit overall despite 136 making a loss in the social dilemma part (Roberts, 1998) . No clear evidence has been 137 provided that playing an image scoring strategy leads to net benefits via indirect reciprocity. 138 139 Furthermore, even if any of the studies purporting to demonstrate image scoring did show 140 that those who gave more did better, this would not be evidence for image scoring: it could 141 be evidence of playing the indiscriminate strategy referred to in the previous sections. What 142 we really need to show is not that those who give most get most, but that those who 143 discriminate most have a higher payoff than those who give to anyone. No paper presents 144 an analysis of this, so no empirical demonstration of indirect reciprocity exists. 145
146
These approaches together show that image scoring is against individual strategic interests; 147 it leads to a conflict of interest between individual and strategy; and it cannot explain indirect 148 reciprocity. Theorists have developed strategies that can outperform image scoring, 149
including 'standing' strategies (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Sugden, 1986) and the 150 'leading eight' set of strategies (Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2006) . Such strategies take a more 151 sophisticated view of defections so that agents do not lose their good standing upon 152 'justified' defection (Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003) . In this paper, I focus on image scoring for 153 several reasons. First, the classic models of image scoring (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998 ) set in 154 train a large theoretical and empirical field (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005) , so if we are to 155 understand that field, we must first understand its foundations. Secondly, despite many 156 developments, the image scoring strategy continues to be by far the most heavily cited (e.g. 157 (Hilbe, Schmid, Tkadlec, Chatterjee, & Nowak, 2018; Whitaker, Colombo, & Rand, 2018)), 158 so those continuing to cite image scoring need to understand it. Thirdly, there remains a 159 focus amongst empiricists on trying to find evidence for image scoring rather than more 160 sophisticated strategies (e.g. Milinski et al., 2001) . On this basis, I use analysis and 161 evolutionary simulation to test the hypotheses (1) that image scoring is not a form of 162 reciprocity; and (2) that helping in these systems is actually a function of relatedness. 163 8 164
Hypothesis 1: Helping in image scoring systems is not a form of reciprocity 165
If cooperation in image scoring systems is due to indirect reciprocity, then perhaps the most 166 obvious criterion would be that there must be evidence that reciprocation is driving the 167 benefits of cooperation: i.e. that strategically, individuals donate to profit from receiving more 168 (where b >c). If donation still occurred in the absence of reciprocation then indirect 169 reciprocity could not be the explanation. 170
171
The basis of any form of reciprocity is that one play involves a cost and that this only results 172 in a net profit when another individual plays and returns the act of help. We can ask whether 173 image scoring is a strategy of (indirect) reciprocity or whether it involves a different selective 174 mechanism. Helpers always pay the cost of helping but with a certain probability they are 175 also helping other helpers. This means that while paying a cost they also benefit their own 176 strategy. So given a probability that they help individuals carrying copies of the same 177 strategy, the strategy can make a net profit through helping. This ability for helping to pay off 178 in one shot interactions is unique to the strategy of helping those who help others. Figure 2  179 illustrates this with the case of an individual who helps other helpers meeting another 180 individual with the same strategy. 181 182 Image scoring is distinct from reciprocity because it requires no reciprocation to work. This is 183 because when an individual carrying a 'help those who helps' strategy helps another 184 individual carrying the same strategy, then it has a stake in the benefits, regardless of 185 whether there is any reciprocation. Helping can be favoured when the donor is 186 sufficiently closely related to the recipient. This probability has been referred to as 'social 187 acquaintanceship' ) (effectively the chance of an agent who helps 188 others meeting another agent who helps others) but can also be described as relatedness. 189 9 190 Crucially, evolutionary simulations use the payoff accrued to strategies to determine how 191 many individuals in next generation carry that strategy: this is how strategies evolve and how 192 we find which strategies are evolutionarily stable. Individuals playing 'image scoring' by 193 helping those who help others are actually helping copies of their own strategy as carried by 194 their recipients, and so image scoring can be seen to be a form of relatedness in which the 195 image scores are markers showing that individuals share the 'help those who help others' 196 strategy. Reciprocity is unnecessary for a "help those who help others" system because 197
helping brings benefits to the helping strategy itself: every helping act actually provides a net 198 benefit to the helping strategy when both actor and recipient are carriers. 199
200
Here, I use evolutionary simulation to test the robustness of this inference. I ask whether 201 agents will help even when they cannot get a return through direct or indirect reciprocation. 202
In all previous considerations of image scoring, agents do not have information about 203 whether it is the last move. In reciprocity, this is predicted to be fatal since no agent should 204 cooperate on a last move (which becomes equivalent in principle to a one-shot game). 205 However, from the analysis above, it follows that image scoring strategies of helping those 206 who help others are predicted to help on the last move when doing so increases the payoff 207 of the strategy, at the expense of the helping individual. 208
Hypothesis 2: Helping in image scoring systems is a function of relatedness 209
My second hypothesis is that helping in image scoring systems is actually explained by 210 relatedness. Individuals help other helpers, not in the expectation of reciprocal help, but 211 because by doing so they are helping copies of the "help those who help others" strategy. 212
Thus, it is a mistake to look for direct fitness benefits through reciprocation. Instead 213 individuals get indirect fitness benefits. Indirect fitness benefits accrue when an individual 214 altruist is related to a recipient. If helping behaviour is a function of relatedness rather than 215 reciprocity, then donations should increase as average relatedness increases. One way to 216 vary relatedness in models is to vary the demographic structure. Here I do this by varying 217 the proportion of local versus global contributions to reproductive success. This technique 218 has the advantage of placing our analyses in the context of the critique by Leimar and 219 Hammerstein (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001) . We can predict that island structure makes it 220 harder for relatedness to operate, because helping other island members has a lower effect 221 on the frequency of a strategy in the next generation. Whereas in a single population, 222 helping another individual of the 'help those who help others' strategy means the benefit 223 goes entirely to the reproductive success of the actor's (and recipient's) strategy, if the next 224 generation is formed of only a portion of a local population, then the relatedness of a 225 recipient will effectively be reduced. Thus, as island effects increase, so it becomes harder to 226 satisfy the proposed condition rb > c for helping to occur. 227 228
Methods 229
Simulation methods were adapted from those in reference (Gilbert Roberts, 2015) . 230
Pseudocode for the simulations is given in Supplementary Information. I modelled indirect 231 reciprocity using a form of first-order reputation indexing known as image scoring (Nowak & 232 Sigmund, 1998). Scores were initialised at 0 for each individual in each generation reflecting 233 the fact that individuals begin their lives without experience. Scores then became -1 234 following defection and 1 following cooperation. Image scores depended only upon the last 235 move. Strategies were defined by their thresholds k, where k = -1 denotes individuals that 236 cooperated unconditionally; k = 0 strategists cooperated provided their partner had never 237 played or had cooperated; k = 1 strategists cooperated provided the partner had cooperated; 238 and k = 2 strategists never cooperated. Individuals interacted in groups of size g with default 239 g = 100. opportunity to donate to a partner from the same group, conditional upon its own strategy 244 and the partner's image score. Focals were assigned partners at random from their group by 245 the program. This interaction process was repeated such that every group member had on 246 average m meetings with every other, either as donor or recipient, where by default m = 1. If 247 the focal donated, it incurred cost c = -1 and the partner received benefit b = 2. The donation 248 cost-benefit ratio was set to 1:2. To avoid negative payoffs (which should not occur in reality 249 provided cooperating costs a small proportion of available resources), all focals had their 250 payoffs incremented by 1 each time they played. 251
252
A meta-population structure was used in which p = 10,000 individuals were distributed 253 evenly over i = 100 islands, where islands are units in which reproduction is structured. Note 254 that the default island size was equal to one group, but the parameters were distinct so that 255 interaction group size could be varied without affecting reproduction and drift. Simulations 256 started with all strategies at k=2 (always defect) and neutral image scores. Simulations were 257 evolutionary in that those strategies accumulating the highest payoff produced most 258 offspring. Reproduction was based on the success of a strategy both within and between 259 islands. The payoffs of all strategies were summed, then individuals were assigned 260 strategies in the next discrete generation in proportion to the relative payoff of each strategy. 261
An individual for the next generation was derived (by default) locally with probability 0.9 and 262 globally with probability 0.1. Population size was therefore kept constant, with each 263 generation being fully replaced by the next. Reproduction was accompanied by mutation: 264 with probability μ = 0.01 an individual's strategy was replaced at random (any strategy could 265 change to any other strategy without having to track through an imposed sequence). 266
Simulations were run for 10,000 generations. 267
268
To test Hypothesis 1, I used the above methods to simulate a helping game in which agents 269 had the flexibility to express a different behaviour on their last move. The simulation method 270 was modified to produce two stages. In the new second stage, agents were selected 271 randomly as in stage 1, but after playing one move (in which they either cooperated or 272 defected, depending on their strategy), they were marked so that they could not be selected 273 as a recipient for any other agent. Behaviour in stage 2 was coded separately, so an agent 274 could help in stage 1, be assigned a positive image score, but then decline to help (defect) in 275 stage 2 when there was no chance of receiving anything afterwards. If helping is selected for 276 because image scores encourage reciprocity, then agents should help in stage 1 but not 277
To test Hypothesis 2, I used the same simulation methods but varied the proportion of local 280 versus global contributions to reproductive success. That is, during the reproduction 281 procedure, an individual for the next generation was derived by default locally with 282 probability 0.9 and globally with probability 0.1 (i.e. the next generation reflected strongly the 283 relative reproductive successes of strategies within the local rather than the global 284 population), but in this set of simulations, these probabilities were varied so as to vary the 285 extent to which individuals could help their relatives. 286 287 3. Results 288
Hypothesis 1 289
Analyzing the results of the simulations I found that the dynamics fit the well-reported pattern 290 of cooperation establishing through conditional strategies (k=0 and k=1) then unconditional 291 cooperation leaking into the conditionally cooperative environment followed by the invasion 292 of all defection, and so the cycle continued (e.g. Sherratt & Roberts, 2001) . I found no 293 difference in the percentage composition of strategies between those expressed during the 294 13 body of the simulation and those expressed on the last move when an agent could not 295 receive anything after donating (Figure 3) . Cooperation rates were 73.36±1.93 and 296 70.16±1.71 respectively in the body versus the last move of the simulations (means and 297 standard errors across 10 simulations, with means calculated across all 10000 generations 298 in each) Thus, having no chance of receiving does not provide a selection pressure to avoid 299 helping. This is in contrast to the prediction from reciprocity theory which is by definition 300 based on there being a return. 301 302
Hypothesis 2 303
As predicted, I found that cooperation declines as relatedness declines. This can be seen in 304 scores (hence it is interpreted as evidence of image scoring in the paper). However, there is 319 no prospect of receiving a return and so no explanation as to why individuals might do this. 320
There is no mechanism for those that discriminate to make a payback, so indirect reciprocity 321 cannot explain the discriminating behaviour in terms of individual benefit. 322 323 Secondly, varying the 'island' structure of the simulations showed that image scoring was 324 only found when helping other agents of the same strategy type resulted in the spread of 325 that strategy through time. In Leimar and Hammerstein's (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001 ) 326 original investigation of image scoring in the context of an island population, they proposed 327 that drift was responsible for Nowak and Sigmund's (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998) finding of 328 cooperation. By introducing population structure they argued that image scoring could not 329
give rise to cooperation without drift. Here I propose instead that the causal factor is 330 relatedness: when this is reduced (by reducing the proportion of offspring that result from 331 success within an island), so cooperation declines. 332
333
To summarize, what has been termed 'indirect reciprocity' in a large literature cannot be 334 explained by individual adaptation; does not explain why help is directed discriminatingly; is 335 not even a form of reciprocity; and is actually a function of relatedness. It works not because 336 of getting a reciprocal benefit but by helping copies of the strategy of "help those who help 337 others". 338
339
Relatedness provides the only adaptive explanation for existing empirical results. In 340 economic game experiments, selection on individual fitness cannot explain why individuals 341 donate, because they do not do better by doing so (Wedekind & Milinski, 2000) . I propose 342 that individuals are helping others who carry the same "help those who help" strategy. As 343 such, they are helping relatives, and this is costly for the individual yet beneficial to the 344 strategy. where q is 'social acquaintanceship' (or the probability of knowing the image score of a 359 recipient) (Nowak, 2006) . I argue that "social acquaintanceship" is actually relatedness. 360
Individuals should pay the cost of helping when this is offset by the benefit to the recipient 361 multiplied by their chance of sharing the same strategy. This is selected for through indirect 362 fitness benefits, and not through indirect reciprocity. 363 364 It has long been recognised that the 'standing' strategy, in which individuals help those who 365 help other helpers (Sugden, 1986) ) may have superior properties to image scoring, at least 366 in theory (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001) , if not in practice (Milinski et al., 2001) . This 367 strategy is in effect a more discriminating version of image scoring: if image scorers help all 368 those who have helped others, those following the standing strategy help a subset of these, 369
i.e. those who have helped other helpers. Thus, standing also works through relatedness, 370
with r being higher than for image scorers. An easy way to see this is to consider a standing 371 strategist on their final play with no chance of receiving a return: they should nevertheless 372 donate to another individual who helps helpers when by doing so this furthers their own 373 strategy. Similarly, selecting a recipient from a range of possibilities has been shown to allow 374 for greater discrimination (Roberts, 2015) , but again this is actually a function of relatedness 375
whereby donors experience higher r by avoiding those that do not carry the same strategy. 376
377
Recognising this resolves the fundamental problem of how cooperation in image scoring 378 systems is individually costly yet beneficial to the strategy: donating is only beneficial in 379 inclusive fitness terms. Reciprocity is an illusion resulting from the fact that individuals 380 receive after revealing their strategy by helping. 'Image scores' are not reputation indices but 381 are actually kinship cues. Where genealogical relatedness is not found, they may be 'green 382 beards': they display a distinguishing phenotype (helping others) allowing individuals to 383 direct help to those who are genetically related (Dawkins, 1976; West & Gardner, 2010) . 384
Green beard altruism is expected to be rare, because individuals might 'cheat', displaying a 385 green beard when they do not have the altruistic gene (but see Keller & Ross, 1998) . 386 However, as recognised by Dawkins himself, helping others is a uniquely honest green 387 beard in that the expression of the helping behaviour is the green beard itself. So helping 388 those who help others is a special case that can promote the spread of altruistic behaviour 389 through the green beard effect of recognizing and favouring those that share the strategy, 390 even when they are not genealogical kin. Recent evidence suggests that hunter gatherers, 391 for example, have social networks that are based as much on similarity in helping behaviour 392 as they are on genealogical kinship ( Trivers, 2006) . This 397 may well be the case, but this paper is actually saying that what has been studied by those 398 using image scoring based models and experiments is not reciprocity at all. Hence the 399 connections between reciprocity theory and green beard theory represent a separate strand 400 of inquiry. 401
402
We can see that 'image scores' simply provide ways of discriminating other carriers of the 403 strategy of helping others (relatives). This is important because indirect reciprocity theory 404 has been employed in proposing how individuals make moral judgements. When individuals 405
give, they are thought to use a potential recipient's image score to decide whether they are 406 'worthy' of receiving. This approach has gone so far as to "define goodness" (Ohtsuki & 407 Iwasa, 2005) and to identify the "leading eight" 'social norms' of 4096 possibilities identified 408 (Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2006) . When individuals fail to cooperate, these defections have been 409 described as 'justified' and 'unjustified' on the basis of whether the partner was cooperative 410 or not (Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003) . The results of this paper demonstrate that these kinds 411 of analyses are mistaken in their quest for a theoretical basis of morality within the context of 412 who is helped: in fact, they are analyses of when indirect fitness supports cooperation. This 413 is a fundamentally different mechanism and explanation. 414 415 I have considered image scoring in this paper, but strategies that better identify relatives will 416 do better, for example I predict that the success of the 'stern judging' strategy (Pacheco et 417 al., 2006) is not to do with morality, reputations and norms (as presented in (Santos, Santos, 418 & Pacheco, 2018)) but is because it is particularly good at directing help to relatives. Giving 419 to non-relatives reduces the effectiveness of the strategy, but according to Hamilton's Rule 420 (Hamilton, 1964) , strategies of helping relatives will still spread when there are inclusive 421 fitness benefits. The problem with image scoring is entirely different. It is that image scoring 422 is intended as a strategy of indirect reciprocity, but is actually costly to the individual, and is 423 outcompeted by other strategies in indirect reciprocity games (Leimar & Hammerstein, 424 2001) . 425 426 Indirect reciprocity has become synonymous with a concern for reputation ( Brandt & 427 Sigmund, 2005; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005 ), yet it is unlikely that indirect reciprocity has any 428 significant role in explaining displays of generosity (e.g. charitable donations). Evidence is 429 much weaker than is typically thought, partly because some authors reference 'image 430 scoring' or 'indirect reciprocity' when they actually just mean increases in pro-social 431 behaviour in a social environment (e.g. Bshary & Grutter, 2006; Yoeli, Hoffman, Rand, & 432 Nowak, 2013) , despite the fact that such phenomena are simply elements of a widespread 433 'observability effect' (Bradley et al., 2018; Burnham & Hare, 2007) . Furthermore, as 434 discussed here, evidence of helping those who have helped others in economic games is 435 not necessarily support for image scoring or indirect reciprocity as has been claimed 436 (Wedekind & Milinski, 2000) because such evidence is equally compatible with kinship. interactions in the evolution of cooperation (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981) . Given the evidence 447
presented here that donations are explained by relatedness, this claim turns out to be false. 448
If indirect reciprocity is a significant explanation for cooperation at all then it's role may be 449 better seen in the original ideas of Alexander (1987) and the reputation models of Pollock 450
and Dugatkin (1992) where observational information is used to inform play on first meeting 451 but crucially the benefits come through finding a partner for direct reciprocity, and not 452 through indirect reciprocity. Whether the fitness benefits of indirect reciprocation can support 453 widespread cooperation must be radically revisited, and we may need to return to the 454 original models of indirect reciprocity which showed it was not adaptive (Boyd & Richerson, 455 1989) . is significant because few new ideas have been as influential in evolutionary biology in 461 recent decades. Given that image scoring has been cited as a decisive factor in the 462 evolution of human large-scale sociality, including morality (who is a worthy recipient) and 463 language (how we share such information) (Alexander, 1987; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; 464 Santos et al., 2018) these issues must be revisited. It also has fascinating implications for 465 the role of cultural evolution, whereby strategies of helping helpers may be passed on within 466 generations by social learning (Boyd & Richerson, 1989) . Even when these strategies are 467 individually costly, strategies of helping other helpers have the special property of being able 468 to spread by helping copies of themselves. This offers a potential explanation for prosocial 469 norms including generosity and fairness. it pays a cost c and provides a benefit b to another individual. Direct reciprocity brings a 481 direct fitness benefit when partners respond by cooperating and when the probability of 482 interactions continuing w is sufficiently large. Indirect reciprocity is expected to have the 483 corresponding condition, but where returns come from individuals other than the recipient of 484 the actor's donation. Image scoring (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998 ) is a postulated mechanism of 485 indirect reciprocity which brings a direct fitness benefit when the probability of knowing the 486 image score of a recipient (q or 'social acquaintanceship' ) is 487 sufficiently large (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998) . Finally, where strategies help copies of the 488 same strategy, cooperating brings an indirect fitness benefit according to Hamilton's rule. 489
Note the similar form of these conditions. 490
Figure 2. Helping in 'image scoring' models can occur without reciprocity 492
Consider here that individual Red observes Green to have helped Blue (where arrows 493 represent helping). Green then has a positive image score and Red, playing an image 494 scoring strategy, pays cost c to benefit Green by amount b (where it is assumed that b>c for 495 reciprocity to pay). Assuming costs and benefits translate into fitness, this means the fitness 496 of Red is reduced by c when it helps. However, the payoff to the strategy of helping those 497 who help others is actually increased on every helping act by amount b -c. This behavior 498 could occur without reciprocity, direct or indirect, when Red and Green are related, 499 according to Hamilton's Rule, rb-c >0 (Hamilton, 1964) . That is, Red pays a cost but Red 500 also gets a benefit in proportion to the probability that Green shares the "help those who help 501 others" strategy. 502 
513
The percentage of helping behaviour in relation to the percentage that a local population 514 (versus the global population) contributes to the next generation. Percent help is expressed 515 as the mean (and standard error) across 20 simulations of the proportion of moves that were 516 cooperative in generation 10,000. Simulations were run with a population of individuals 517 divided into 10 islands with N=100 on each. Reproduction was varied so that strategy 518 frequencies in the next generation reflected strategy payoffs on the local island and those 519 averaged across all islands. Thus, x% was derived from the local island while 1-x% took 520 their strategy from the global population. Relatedness between donors and receivers 521 increases as the reproduction regime favours local proportions because this means that 522 helping others that carry the same strategy will have more impact on the success of that 523 strategy. The line shows the level of cooperation predicted from the change in relatedness 524 as local contributions change. As predicted, cooperation declines as local contributions, and 525 thereby relatedness, declines. There appears to be a threshold at around a 50:50 ratio of 526 local to global. 527
